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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
KATHRYN c. WILLIAMS, Conservator
of the Estate of John E. Boyer,

)
)
)
Plaintiff-Appellant,
)
)
v.
)
)
)
DANNY GENE BOYER and MICHAEL
)
BOYER,
)
)
Defendants-Respondents.
)
~~~~--~--~---~--~~-)

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

Docket No. 18125

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action brought by the Conservator of the Estate
of John E. Boyer to have two Quit-Claim Deeds declared void and
vacated based on the grounds that John E. Boyer, one of the
grantors of those deeds, was incompetent at the time of their
execution.
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE BY LOWER COURT
Following trial before the Court, the Honorable David B.
Dee found that John E. Boyer was competent at the time of the
execution of the deeds and therefore rendered judgment for
Defendants and entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents seek this Court's affirmance of the judgment of
the trial court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
John E. Boyer and Eva B. Boyer, who is now deceased, were
husband and wife.

Plaintiff-Appellant Kathryn C. Williams, who

is a daughter of John and Eva Boyer, is also the Conservator of
the Estate of John E. Boyer.

Defendant-Respondent Michael

Boyer is a son of John and Eva Boyer.
Michael Boyer)

(R. 235--testirnony of

Defendant-Respondent Danny Gene Boyer is a

grandson of and was raised by John and Eva Boyer.

(R. 260,

261--testimony of Danny Gene Boyer).
In December, 1960, and again in January, 1981, John Boyer
was diagnosed as having Alzheimer's disease.
133-34--testimony of Moench)

(R. 129, 131,

This is a disease of the

premature degeneration of the cerebral cortex of the brain, a
process of degeneration quite similar to senile dementia as is
seen in advanced age.

(R. 133-34, 144--testimony of Moench)

On June 6, 1961, John Boyer was admitted for treatment to the
Utah State Hospital and on January 4, 1963, he returned home to
reside on a home visit until his release from the hospital on
April 30, 1964.

(R. 91, 93--testimony of Elliott)

John and Eva Boyer owned as joint tenants two pieces of
property which are the subject of this lawsuit.

Their home is

located on one of the properties at 875 Glendale Street
(hereinafter called the "house property").

The other property

-2Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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which is adjacent to the house property contained a garage
which is known as Lots 4 and 5, Block 5, Glendale Addition
(hereinafter called the "garage property").
On May 14, 1976, John and Eva Boyer executed a will which
was prepared by Wayne Ashworth, an attorney practicing in Salt
Lake City.

{R. 95, 96--testimony of Ashworth)

Under the will,

the Defendant Michael Boyer was to receive the house property
and Defendant Danny Gene Boyer was to receive the garage
property.
John Boyer was concerned that the will would have to be
probated and he inquired of Mr. Ashworth if there were a way to
avoid probate.

{R. 99, 104--testimony of Ashworth)

Mr.

Ashworth advised Mr. Boyer that he may avoid probate by deeding
the property to Michael and Danny.

In response to Mr. Boyer's

request, Mr. Ashworth prepared deeds to the properties.
104--testimony of Ashworth)

(R.

On May 18, 1976, John and Eva

Boyer executed two Quit-Claim Deeds, one conveying the house
property to Michael Boyer and the other conveying the garage
property to Danny Gene Boyer.
103-05--testimony of Ashworth)

(Exhibits 4, 5; R.
Both deeds contained a

reservation of life estate to John and Eva Boyer.
106-07--testimony of Ashworth)
Michael Boyer.

John Boyer recorded the deed to

(R. 105--testimony of Ashworth)

recorded the deed to Danny Gene Boyer.
Ashworth)

(R.

Wayne Ashworth

(R. 108--testimony of

Michael Boyer and Danny Gene Boyer did not request

or encourage the preparation of the deeds.

They did not even
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know that the Boyers contemplated conveying the properties.
Michael first found out about the deeds approximately two years
after they were executed in February of 1978 when his mother
showed them to him.

(R. 246--testimony of Michael Boyer)

Shortly after that time, Danny Gene Boyer for the first time
also heard about the deed to him.

(R. 265-66--testimony of

Danny Gene Boyer).
On April 19, 1978, Plaintiff Kathryn C. Williams was
appointed Conservator of the Estate of John E. Boyer.
7; R.

149--testimony of Kathryn

c.

Williams)

(Exhibit

She initiated

suit against Defendants to avoid and cancel the deeds on the
grounds that John Boyer lacked sufficient capacity to convey
property and Defendants fraudulently procured the signature of
John Boyer on the deeds.

(R. 2-4--Plaintiff 's Complaint)

At

trial the parties stipulated to strike the fraud allegation.
(R. 233)

In rendering judgment for Defendants, the trial court

found that John Boyer did have and possess sufficient legal
capacity to execute and deliver the deeds and that the deeds
were validly executed and delivered.
and Conclusions of Law)

(R. 74--Findings of Fact

The Plaintiff appeals from that

judgment, claiming that the trial court erred in finding that
John Boyer had sufficient legal capacity to execute and deliver
the deeds and in placing the burden on the Plaintiff to prove
the invalidity of the deeds.
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ARGUMENT

POINT I

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT JOHN BOYER HAD
SUFFICIENT CAPACITY TO CONVEY THE PROPERTY.

Appellant contends that the trial court erred in finding
that John Boyer had sufficient capacity to execute and deliver
the deeds.

Since this is an action in equity, this Court may

review the evidence; however, the Court must take into account
the advantaged position of the trial judge and should only
reverse when the evidence clearly preponderates against his
decision.

Peterson v. Carter, 579 P.2d 329 (Utah 1978); Chugg

v. Chugg, 9 Utah 2d 256, 342 P.2d 875 (1959).

In Del Porto v.

Nicolo, 27 Utah 2d 286, 495 P.2d 811, 812 (1970), the Utah
Supreme Court stated:
It is true, as plaintiff asserts, that this action to avoid
deeds is one in equity upon which this Court has both the
prerogative and duty to review and weigh the evidence, and
to determine the facts. However, in the practical
application of that rule is well established in our own
decisional law that due to the advantaged position of the
trial court, in close proximity to the parties and the
witnesses, there is indulged a presumption of correctness
of his findings and judgment, with the burden upon the
appellant to show they were in error; and where the
evidence is in conflict, we do not upset his findings
merely because we may have reviewed the matter differently,
but do so only if evidence clearly preponderates against
them.
The time of the execution of the deed is the material or
critical point of time to be considered upon the inquiry as to
the grantor's capacity.

Stringfellow v. Hanson, 25 Utah 480,

71 Pac. 1052 (1903).
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The Utah Supreme Court has on a number of times defined the
test to determine whether the grantor has sufficient capacity
to make a deed.
The test whether grantor had sufficient mental capacity to
make a deed is: Were mental faculties so deficient or
impaired that there was not sufficient power to comprehend
the subject of the deed, its nature and its probable
consequences, and to act with discretion in relation
thereto, or with relation to ordinary affairs of life?
Peterson v. Carter, supra at 331; accord:

Anderson v. Thomas,

108 Utah 252, 159 P.2d 142, 146 {1945); O'Reilly v. McLean, 84
Utah 551, 37 P.2d 770, 772 {1934); Burgess v. Colby, 93 Utah
103, 71 P.2d 185 {1937).

In Stringfellow, supra, at 1054, the Utah Supreme Court, in
discussing the mental capacity of the grantor, stated:
The test is, has the party at the time sufficient reason
and mental capacity to understand the nature of the
contract he is entering into, and to realize and appreciate
the probable results of the transaction? If so, he would
be bound by his acts, and equity, in the absence of fraud
and mistake, will not relieve him from his bargain, however
unreasonable, in the judgment, of others, it may appear to
be.
It is clear from the test as announced by the Utah Supreme
Court, there is not a two-part test in determining the capacity
of the granter as the Appellant seems to argue.

There does not

have to be both a finding of capacity to convey property and of
sufficient capacity to form the intent to transfer property as
is required under the doctrine of delivery as Appellant
argues.

Inherent in the test to determine the capacity of the

granter to convey is that he understands the nature and the
probable
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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consequences of a deed.

Thus, the grantor must have the intent

to convey the property to meet this test.
Courts have generally construed the competency requirement
liberally, demonstrating the difficulty in determining who in
this society composed of individuals of varying personalities
and levels of intelligence has the sufficient mental faculties
to conduct his own affairs.

In Stringfellow, supra, at 1055,

the court stated:
Even if his mind were weak and debilitated, compared to
what it had been, his demeanor on occasion eccentric, and
even if he had not capacity to transact general business,
yet if he understood, as he clearly did, the nature of that
particular act--recollect the property he was disposing of,
and the person to whom he is giving it, and how he desired
to dispose of it--has enough to make his act valid.
In Chugg, supra, the court noted that it was not to be
questioned that the plaintiff's evidence in that case standing
alone would be sufficient to support a finding that the granter
was incompetent, at least at some times during which the
questioned transactions occurred.

However, the Utah Supreme

Court found that "there is ample basis therein upon which to
reject plaintiff's contention that he had proved by clear and
convincing evidence that Nathan Chugg [the grantor] was neither
incompetent or a victim of undue influence."

432 P.2d at 878.

In Peterson, supra, Mrs. Peterson, a 91-year-old woman
living in a rest home, conveyed her home and underlying real
property to others.

Subsequently, a guardian was appointed

over the person and estate of Mrs. Peterson and he brought suit
to vacate the deed based on the grantor's incompetence and
-7Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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undue influence in connection with the conveyance.

The trial

court refused to vacate the deed and the Utah Supreme Court
affirmed.

The Utah Supreme Court stated that "[i]rrespective

of Mrs. Peterson's competency now, or even before the
conveyance, substantial evidence was introduced to show that at
the time of the conveyance, Mrs.
the nature of the transaction."

Peterson knew and understood
579 P.2d at 331.

The attorney

who was asked to assist in completing the transaction testified
that after having talked with Mrs.

Peterson and after her

various questions about the effect of the sale had been
answered; "there was no question in my mind that she knew what
she was doing and she wanted the home to go to Mr.
Carter."

579 P.2d at 331.

and Mrs.

The Utah Supreme Court stated:

Although other testimony might show Mrs. Peterson's
incompetence, we are inclined to defer to the trial court's
decision due to his proximity to the situation and his
ability to observe the witnesses and their demeanor.
579 P.2d at 331.
As in Peterson, supra, the attorney involved in the
transactions in the instant case also testified concerning
those transactions.

Wayne Ashworth, a member of the Utah State

Bar, prepared a will for John and Eva Boyer and that will was
executed on May 14, 1976.
Ashworth)

(R. 94, 95, 96, 101--testimony of

Wayne Ashworth and his secretary, Carol Barbury,

were witnesses to the will.

(R. 97--testimony of Ashworth)

Defendant Michael Boyer and his wife, Jaylene Boyer, were to
receive under the will the house property and Danny Gene Boyer
was to receive the garage property.

(R. 100--testimony of

Ashworth).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The Boyers had come into Ashworth's office on May 10, 1976,
when Ashworth was not in and left the information they wanted
in the will with his secretary, Carol Barbury.
95--testimony of Ashworth)

(R.

Mr. Ashworth called Mr. Boyer

before preparing the will to make sure that he wanted it the
way he had stated to his secretary.
a couple of times on the phone.

He had talked to Mr. Boyer

(R. 99-110--testimony of

Ashworth).
Mr. Ashworth testified that at the time of signing of the
will, Mr. Boyer appeared normal and was interested in the
transaction.
(By Mr. Weston) Directing your attention, Mr.
Ashworth, to the time you were here signing the will with
Mr. and Mrs. Boyer in the presence of Mrs. Jensen [maiden
name for Mrs. Barbury], did you observe anything at that
time about Mr. Boyer's condition?

Q.

A.

No.

He appeared normal to me.

At any time during that meeting do you recall that Mr.
Boyer did anything or said anything that seemed unusual to
you?
Q.

A.

No.

Q. How did he appear as far as being interested in or
alert to what was going on at the time?
A. Well, he appeared to know what he wanted about that,
because I thought to myself, •why is he giving it to his
grandson?" I didn't ask him why, but I thought that was a
little unusual. I thought if that was his wishes, I'd put
that in the will.
(R. 101--testimony of Ashworth)
Mr. Ashworth also testified that at the time of the signing
of the will, Mr. Boyer appeared to be sound of mind.
Q. At the time Mr. Boyer signed the will on this occasion,
did you then form any opinion about his soundness of mind?
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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A. No. Not really. I mean, he appeared of sound mind to
me. You know, if he had acted a little bit funny or
something like that, I would have had some reservations
about him signing the will the way it was made up.
Q.

Did you have any reservations?

A.

None whatsoever.

Q.

Based on what you saw and heard?

A.

No.

What is your opinion as to whether he was sound of mind
and understood what he was doing?

Q.

A. I think he was mentally sound at the time he signed
it. There was nothing to indicate to me that he was
anything else but.
Do you have an opinion as to whether or not he knew he
was signing a will?

Q.

A. I'm sure he did, because I talked to him after we got
the information on the form. I had a couple of phone calls
from him to discuss it.
Q.

Do you recall what he said at that time?

No, I don't recall. It was--after I read the note that
the secretary had taken, I had a couple of questions I
wanted to ask him. So I did call him to make sure that
that's the way he wanted it. Like I said before, it seemed
a little unusual that he was going to give it to this one
child and the grandson. so I called him back to fully
discuss this with him and asked if that was the way he
wanted it.

A.

Q.

Was that before or after he signed the will?

A.

That was before.

In your opinion did he know who his heirs were at that
time?

Q.

A. Well, he--I would--! think he must have done, because
he gave me all of their names.
(R. 102-103--testirnony of Ashworth)

Mr. Ashworth testified that Mr. Boyer read the will and
asked whether the will would have to be probated.

He wanted to

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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property.

(R.

Mr. Boyer asked if

99--testimony of Ashworth)

there was any way he could get out of probate, and Mr. Ashworth
advised him that there is a possibility to avoid probate by
deeding the property to the children and reserving a life
estate to Mr. Boyer.

In response to Mr. Boyer's request, Mr.

Ashworth prepared the deeds conveying the house property to
Michael Boyer and the garage property to Danny Gene Boyer.

The

deeds were executed by John and Eva Boyer on May 18, 1976, four
days after the Boyers had signed the will.
5).

(Exhibits 4, and

The deeds were notarized by Mr. Ashworth and witnessed by

Carol Barbury.

(R. 104--testimony of Ahsworth)

Mr. Ashworth testified that in his opinion there is no
question that Mr. Boyer had capacity to sign the deeds.
Q.
(By Mr. Weston) Directing your attention, Mr.
Ashworth, to the time that these deeds were executed in the
Boyer home, did you observe anything about Mr. Boyer at the
time that was unusual in his conduct?

A.

I did not.

Q.
Did he appear to be interested and attentive to what
was going on?

A.

Yes.

Were you concerned, to the best you can recall at this
late date, were you concerned at that time as to whether he
understood what he was signing? Do you understand my
question?
Q.

A.

Give me that question again.

Q. Reflecting back on what you observed at the time, did
you then have any concern as to whether Mr. Boyer really
understood what he was signing?

A. No, I didn't. Not for a minute.
question about his capacity to sign.

I

didn't have any

(R. 108--testimony of Ashworth)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Carol Barbury, Mr. Ashworth's secretary who had taken the
information initially from the Boyers concerning the will, also
testified that Mr. Boyer understood the will and was perfectly
sound of mind at the time of the execution of the will.
Directing your attention to the time that the will was
signed--this, as I understand, was in your office, is that
correct--in Mr. Ashworth's office?

Q.

A.

Yes.

Do you recall at all the demeanor that Mr. Boyer had at
that time? Did he appear to be alert and interested?

Q.

A.

Yes, he was.

Q.

Do you know whether he read the will before he signed

it?

A.

Yes he did.

Q.

You saw him read it?

A.

Yes.

Was there anything about what Mr. Boyer said or what he
did that gave you any concern as to whether he really
understood what he was doing?

Q.

A.

No.

From what you observed, did you at that time frame any
opinion as to whether he was sound of mind and understood
what he was doing?
Q.

A. He seemed to be perfectly sound of mind and understood
just what he was doing.
Q.

You've had no concern--

A.

No.

Q.

--with what you saw and observed then?

A.

No.

(R. 118-19--testimony of Barbury)
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Additionally, Mrs. Barbury testified that Mr. Boyer was
alert and attentive at the time of signing of the deeds.
Directing your attention to the time that the deeds
were signed at the Boyer home, in that same regard did Mr.
Boyer on that occasion appear to be alert, attentive, and
interested in what was going on?

Q.

A. Yes. He seemed to be very relieved to sign the deed to
know it was going to be the way he wanted it.
Do you recall discussing the deeds with Mr. Boyer at
that time or hearing any discussion at that time with Mr.
Boyer?

Q.

A. I don't recall the exact conversation no. It is just
that--the thing I do recall is that he said: "Now, this
should take care of everything. This should put it the way
I want it." And Mr. Ashworth said, 'It should.' Other
than that, I don't recall, no.
Do you recall on that occasion at the home when the
deeds were being signed Mr. Boyer saying or doing anything
to give you any impression or concern as to whether he
really understood what he was doing?

Q.

No he didn't.

A.

(R. 119-20--testimony of Barbury)

Joseph Kankelborg, who is the son-of-law of John and Eva
Boyer, testified that in May of 1976 he was at the Boyer home
for a birthday party for his daughter and at that time John
Boyer told him that he had gone to the lawyer to sign papers
that had given Michael the home and Danny the property in
back.

(R.

310-311--testimony of Joseph Kankelborg).

Richard

Kankelborg testified that at that time John Boyer knew his name
and he knew whether or not he owned his house.

Kankelborg did

not find Mr. Boyer's behavior socially unacceptable or socially
unusual.

(R.

313--testimony of Kankelborg)

Michael Boyer

testified that in May of 1976 John Boyer knew where he was
-13Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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living and who his children were.
Michael Boyer)

(R. 244-45--testimony of

John Boyer had cared for his wife, Eva, after

her stroke between 1972 to 1978.

He gave her medication,

washed the clothes, did the general housework and made the
meals.

(R. 247--testimony of Michael Boyer).

Danny Boyer testified that he did not notice anything about
John Boyer's conduct or his activities
about his mental competency.
Boyer).

t~at

made him doubt

(R. 268--testimony of Danny Gene

Sherry Lynn Kankelborg, daughter of John and Eva

Boyer, testified that John Boyer understood who he was, where
he lived and whether he owned his own home.
of Sherry Lynn Kankelborg)

(R. 296--testimony

She also testified that John

Boyer's behavior was socially appropriate.

(R.

296-97--testimony of Kankelborg) Marilyn Rosemary Boyer,
another daughter of John and Eva Boyer, testified that her
testimony is the same as Michael's, Danney's and Sherry's as to
John Boyer's competency.

(R. 318--testimony of Marilyn Boyer)

Robert Boyer, another son of John and Eva Boyer, testified that
his testimony would be the same as Michael's, Danny's and
Sherry's as to the recollection and understanding of John Boyer
of the circumstances around him.

(R.

324--testimony of Robert

Boyer)
Dr. Moench, a psychiatrist, testified that he had examined
John Boyer in December of 1960 and again in January of 1981 and
he concluded that Mr. Boyer had an organic brain sydrome known
as Alzheimer's disease.

(R. 129-,130,133-34--testimony of
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Moench)

He gave his opinion that at the time of the signing of

the deeds, Boyer's condition would not have been significantly
different than at the time of the examinations and that Boyer
wouldn't know the meaning of a legal document.

(R.

134-135--testimony of Moench).
However, Dr. Moench did not see or examine Mr. Boyer
between the time of the examination in December, 1960, and the
examination in January of 1981, a 21-year gap.

(R.

135--testimony of Moench) Dr. Moench also admitted that the
degeneration with Alzheimer's disease can take place at varying
rates; and one cannot predict the rate of deterioration.
137--testimony of Moench)

Dr.

(R.

Moench also testified that with

this type of condition, it is possible there can be a remission
for a period of time, even a lucid interval or improvement for
a period of time.

(R. 140-141--testimony Moench)

It is even

possible that Mr. Boyer may very well have entertained a degree
of lucidity that would have permitted him to understand the
nature of his property and the boundaries of the same and the
names of his heirs.

(R. 142--testimony of Moench)

was not able to say with certainty that Mr.
know if he owned his own home.

Dr. Moench

Boyer would not

(R. 140--testimonv of Moench)

It is also possible though not probable that Mr. Boyer would
have known the names of his children and would have recognized
his children.

(R. 140--testimony of Moench).

In summary Dr. Moench could not say definitely that in May,
1976, Mr. Boyer did not have sufficient lucidity to have
permitted him to have knowingly executed the deeds.
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You feel his ability was impaired? And finally. the
bottom line is that from your experience, Doctor; from what
you have seen in the years of your practice, you were not
able to say definitely that in May of 1976 Mr. Boyer did
not have a sufficient lucid interval to have permitted him
to have executed the deeds, clearly understanding the
property that he was conveying and the individuals to whom
those interests were being conveyed? Is that correct?

Q.

A. No, sir. I was not there. I did not examine him at
that time. I could only give an opinion.
(R. 147--Testimony of Moench).

Plaintiff and her husband testified that John Boyer was
incompetent.

The main basis for this conclusion is their

allegation that Mr. Boyer remained in the home with his wife
even though she was allegedly sleeping with a boarder in the
home, Mr. Deberry.

(See R. 159--testimony of Kathryn

c.

Williams; R. 174--testimony of Jack D. Williams.) Appellant's
counsel also argues that John Boyer must have been incompetent
if he would abandon his wife to a boarder.
Brief at 10.)

(See Appellant's

The Appellant argues that the circumstances in

the John Boyer home for the years immediately preceding the
execution of the deeds would compel a finding of Mr. Boyer's
incompetency.

However, such ignores the evidence of a father

who was gainfully and responsibly employed until December of
1960 and who maintained thereafter a close and a considerate
relationship with his family and who involved himself in the
care of the home and his wife after she suffered a stroke in
1972.

The evidence portrays John Boyer as having a loving,

warm and tolerant nature.

It is completely without merit to

assume, as Appellant contends, that there were improper
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circumstances existing in John Boyer's home and that Mr.
Boyer's continuing attention and interest in his wife and
family were to insufficient mental capacity rather than to a
loving and forgiving nature.
There has been substantial evidence in this case that John
Boyer had sufficient power to comprehend the subject and nature
of the deeds that he executed in May of 1976 and that he
understood the consequences of the deeds.

He was interested

that Michael and Danny Gene receive the property.

He did not

want probate to pose an interference to that desire.

The

evidence is conflicting yet it does not clearly preponderate
against the findings of the trial court which is presumed
correct that John Boyer did have legal capacity to execute the
deeds.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY PLACED THE BURDEN OF
PROOF OF THE INVALIDITY OF THE DEEDS UPON PLAINTIFF.

Appellant argues that the court erred in placing the
burden upon Plaintiff to show that the deeds were not
authentic.

It is clear that the language of that court that

Appellant cites to in the record concerns to the burden of
proving the competency of the grantor.

The court stated that

the Plaintiff bears the burden of showing that John Boyer was
mentally incompetent.

(R.

180-81)

It is clear that the party

attacking the competency of the granter bears the burden of
proving his incompetency.

It is presumed that the grantor in
-17-
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the deed was competent to execute it at the time of its
execution and the burden of proving incompetency is on the
person alleging it.

O'Reilly, supra, at 772.

In Chugg, supra,

a 876 the court discussed the burden of proof in context of the
suit to void a deed on the basis of the incompetency of a
grantor.
The deed and bill of sale conveying the property to Dale
are in proper form and duly executed, and the deed is
acknowledged and recorded. This establishes prima facie
the genuineness of the transaction and casts upon the party
attacking it the burden of showing invalidity of the
documents by clear and convincing evidence.
Appellant appears to argue that since the transaction in
this case was between close relatives, there is a confidential
relationship and the Respondents bear the burden of proving
that the transaction was fair.

It is true that if there is a

confidential relationship, the superior party must prove the
fairness of the transaction.
If a confidential relationship is shown to exist, and a
gift or conveyance is made to a party in a superior
position, a presumption arises that the transaction was
unfair; this presumption has the force of evidence and will
itself support a finding if not over come by counterveiling
evidence. The burden is upon the superior party to
convince the court by a preponderance (not clear and
convincing) of the evidence that the transaction was fair.
Bradbury v. Rasmussen, 16 Utah 2d 378, 401 P.2d 710, 713, n. 4
(1965).
However, this rule is clearly inapplicable in the
transaction involving Michael Boyer and Danny Gene Boyer.
Neither Michael Boyer and Danny Gene Boyer were involved in the
transactions in this case.

They did not request or encourage
-18-
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the preparation of the deeds.

Neither knew that the deeds

were, in fact, executed or that the Boyers even contemplated
conveying the properties.

Michael and Danny Gene first found

out about the deeds approximately two years after they were
executed in February of 1978.

{R. 246--testimony of Michael

Boyer; R. 265-66--testimony of Danny Gene Boyer}

Clearly, a

presumption of unfairness would not arise in this situation
where the grantees were not involved in the transactions and
did not even know that the transactions were developing.
Appellant seems to argue that since Eva Boyer was in a
confidential relationship to John Boyer, then the Defendants
bear the burden of showing the fairness of the transaction.
However, the rule requiring the showing of fairness would not
apply in this situation.

The purpose of the doctrine of

confidentiality is to not allow a person in a superior position
in a confidential relationship to unfairly benefit from that
relationship.

In this case, even if Evan Boyer were found to

be in a confidential relation with John Boyer, she did not
benefit from that relationship.

She did not receive the

property from Mr. Boyer.
In Hatch v. Hatch, 46 Utah 218, 148 Pac. 433, 437-38 {1914),
the court stated:
. • . If the courts should interfere in a transaction
between husband and wife, or between those of parent and
child, every time it is shown that the wife asked, or even
coaxed, the husband to transfer property either to her or
to one of the children or both of them, all such
transactions must of necessity cease. such, fortunately,
is not the law, and the courts have frequently so
declared.
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Even if the law of confidentiality may apply in this
situation, Defendants have failed to prove that a confidential
relationship existed; that John Boyer reposed confidence in Eva
Boyer that resulted in Eva Boyer's superiority and influence
over John Boyer.

The relation of husband and wife does not in

and of itself create any presumption of a relationship of trust
and confidence that will cast the burden of proof to show the
fairness of the transaction.

Hatch, supra, at 438.

In

Bradbury, supra, at 713, the court stated:
While kinship may be a factor in determining the existence
of a legally significant confidential relatioship
confidential relationships, there must be a showing, in
addition to the kinship, of reposal of competence by one
party and the resulting superiority and influence of the
other party. The relationship must be such as would lead
an ordinary prudent person in the management of his
business affairs to repose that degree of confidence in the
other party which largely results in the substitution of
the will of the latter for that of the former in material
matters involved in the transaction. The doctrine of
confidential relationship rests upon the principle of
inequality between the parties, and implies a position of
superiority occupied by one of the parties over the other.
Mere confidence in one person by another is not sufficient
alone to constitute such a relationship. The confidence
must be reposed by one under such circumstances as to
create a corresponding duty, either legal or moral, upon
the part of the other to observe the competence, and it
must result in a situation where as a matter of fact there
is a superior influence on one side and dependence on the
other.
Appellant has failed to produce any evidence which shows
the motive or purpose of Eva Boyer in conveying the property.
Appellant has failed to produce any evidence Eva Baver was in a
superior position over John Boyer and that John Boyer reposed
such confidence in Eva Boyer that Eva had any resulting
superiority of influence over him.
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Even if Respondents do bear the burden of showing that the
transaction was fair, that burden has been met.

John and Eva

Boyer made a gift of property to the son and to a grandson whom
they raised and cared for.

The Boyers had a loving and caring

relationship with the Defendants.

There is no evidence that

the transaction was unfair or improper.
CONCLUSION

The evidence in this case, even though conflicting, does
not clearly preponderate against the trial court's finding that
John Boyer has sufficient mental capacity to convey the
property.

Appellant bears the burden of showing John Boyer's

incapacity.

Additionally, the doctrine of confidential

relationship does not apply to this case.

If it does apply,

there is no evidence that a confidential relationship did exist.
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